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Changing the way that referees are paid would be an
important step towards preventing match fixing in European
football.
Blog Admin
Earlier this month Europol announced some preliminary results from a major investigation
into match fixing in world football. In total, 380 matches played in Europe have been
identified as suspicious, with 425 individuals suspected of involvement. Tito Boeri and
Battista Severgnini write on recent experiences with match fixing in Italy. Their research
indicates that most referees involved in illegal gambling are motivated by career concerns,
and that a flat-rate of pay would eliminate some of the incentives to cut corners in a bid to
be promoted to more lucrative matches.
Almost every week there are media reports on international police inquiries related to
match-f ixing in prof essional f ootball. Indeed, hundreds of  matches in Europe are
currently under investigation. The range of  events involved goes all the way f rom Uef a
Champions League matches, to domestic lower league competit ions.
The relationship between sport and corruption has deep historical roots. Organised
corruption has been f requent in sports as f ar back as the Olympic Games in Ancient
Greece. Cheating in cycling and baseball predates match f ixing in f ootball. As early as 1896, cyclists were
accused of  doping in the Bordeaux-Paris race, while there is evidence that in 1919 gamblers bribed the
baseball players of  the Chicago White Sox to intentionally lose games in baseball’s World Series (the so
called ‘Black Sox scandal’).
Ongoing judicial investigations are not only
the byproduct of  stricter police co-
ordination under the active involvement of
Interpol and Europol, but also point to an
escalation of  the phenomenon. Football is
no longer dealing with isolated episodes of
corruption, but with a web of  deceit in a
 globalised and interconnected structure of
criminality. These events risk alienating
supporters, discouraging stadium
attendance and reducing the revenues of
f ootball teams: which may in turn induce
f urther match f ixing in order to pay the
wage bill. According to Interpol Secretary
General Ronald Noble, the illegal betting
system can be valued at hundreds of  bilions
of  euros per year: with large bookmakers
estimated to generate revenues as large as
Coca-Cola. Moreover there are suggestions that blackmail may play a role in match f ixing, with
management threatening to withold wages unless players co-operate.
Needless to say, the nature and determinants of  match f ixing are dif f icult to characterise. Following Vito
Tanzi’s apt comparison, it might be said that corruption is like an elephant: dif f icult to describe in
isolation, but not dif f icult to recognise. Observing and understanding corruption in f ootball is an
extremely dif f icult task as the actors and f orces which drive it are not easily observable. However, the
scandals unveiled by police investigations, together with economic theory, gives us the opportunity to
understand relevant f eatures of  match f ixing and possibly f ind ways to reduce the likelihood of  it taking
place again in the f uture.
A case study of match f ixing in Italy
Police investigations, judicial records and media reports suggest that there are two main reasons f or
altering a match. On the one hand, match f ixing can be aimed at helping a team f rom a sporting
perspective (e.g. to win a tournament, or qualif y f or a major competit ion such as the Champions
League).  On the other hand, gamblers can illegally bribe players in order to make a f inancial return f rom
f ixed matches.
In our work, we concentrate on the f irst type of  match f ixing, drawing on records f rom the Calciopoli
scandal, which took place in the 2004-5 Italian f ootball season. A number of  matches were rigged by
exerting pressure on ref erees, who represent the lowest paid component of  the f ootball industry. It was
not the f irst episode of  this kind, but most likely the f irst t ime that pressure on ref erees was exerted in a
systematic f ashion, as shown by tapped phone conversations between general team managers,
ref erees, and journalists. The Italian police was able to uncover a hidden system created to rig games by
choosing ref erees f avourable to the Turin-based team Juventus (the winner of  the Italian league tit le)
and other teams, such as A.C. Milan, Fiorentina, S.S. Lazio, and Reggina. Sanctions were imposed by the
Italian f ootball authorit ies on these teams, with Juventus being relegated to the Second Division and the
other teams receiving a range of  f inancial and sporting penalties, but there is still doubt as to whether
the problem has been solved permanently.
Our study addressed two main questions. First, we assessed the main determinants of  match f ixing.
Second, we attempted to determine which actors are most likely to be involved in the phenomenon. Our
f indings indicate that pressure on ref erees is exerted by drawing on their career concerns, which can be
a very strong substitute f or f inancial bribes. The promotion of  ref erees to higher levels, and to
international standing, involves very large jumps in earning potential. According to the data that we
collected, the increase in lif etime earnings can be as large as 1.7 bilion euros. It was precisely those
ref erees who were at the stage of  their career where this promotion could be awarded who were
selected f or the matches to be rigged.
Our results suggest that reducing match f ixing may involve changing the career prof iles and pay
incentives of  ref erees. In addition, better monitoring of  the decisions made to allocate games to specif ic
ref erees, the evaluation process which occurs af ter each match, and the decisions to promote ref erees
to higher levels, would be benef icial. More importantly, the adoption of  compensation schemes with
signif icant f lat-rate salary components could prevent ref erees f rom becoming dependent on the
selection decisions made by the committees who assign ref erees to various matches. In this respect it is
encouraging that several f ootball f ederations are moving in this direction, f ollowing the example of
f ootball associations in the UK.
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